Winter Warfare: Red Army Orders and Experiences (Soviet (Russian) Study of War)
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Based on German and Soviet military archival material, this book provides an insight into the tactics and planning for combat in a winter climate. It also studies the mechanisms for change in an army during the course of battle.
The first part of the book looks at the tactical pamphlet 'People's Commissar for Defence Order No. 109', as passed by Red Army units on 4 March 1941, which provided regulations for combat in Winter. The second part of the book, using material from the Soviet military archives, reveals Red Army General Staff supplements to the winter regulation.
148. Air reconnaissance must promptly locate enemy concentrations and quickly report to friendl y units. 149. Reconnaissance operations on skis must penetrate the intervals between enemy columns by bold attacks, to determine the grouping of enemy main force units and ascertain to what degree the enemy is furnished with winter equipment. Staff officers are always attached to the reconnaissance so they can be used as column commanders during the development. 150. With initiation of the meeting
prompt construction of ski trails and by clearing snow from roads. To repulse enemy attacks, a network of roads and ski trails must be established. This is especially important for bivouac positions in forests, shrubbery and depressions with high snow covering. 208. When quartering for rest in villages that the enemy has abandoned, engineers, chemical crews, and medical and veterinary services must inspect sites carefully before use. Quarter a reinforced battalion that is capable of conducting
transport. Defensive operations 1. The operational defense finds its complete expression within the framework of the Front. The front organizes the maintenance ofspecific operational lines and the maneuver of echelons. 2. The basis of an operational defense should be the preservation of an organized front, with support of the interaction among the various operational regions, and directions for achieving the assigned goals of a given defense . 129 THE EXPERIENCES 3. The depth of the Front
of no help to the infantry, they also delayed infantry operations. For example, the artillery of the 334th Rifle Division, during the battle for Nelidovo on 24January 1942, lagged behind, and with the exception of regimental artillery guns and one gun of the 270th Artillery Regiment, did not participate in the battle . Lack of roads, deep snowdrifts, lack of fuel, rations and forage, led to the fact that in the Toropets Operation army artillery lagged 70 kilometers behind the troops, and
the enemy attack . The Regulation For Combat Action of Troops in Winter illustrates the Red Army's understanding of the degree of preparation necessary for soldiers and units to conduct winter warfare . 8 INTRODUCTIO N PART 2: RED ARMY WAR EXPERIENCES Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in the summerofl941 dragged on into winter. The German army proved to be an unprepared invader against the more experienced Red Army in winter warfare. A German veteran of the Russian winter recalled the