Recast All under Heaven: Revolution, War, Diplomacy, and Frontier China in the 20th Century
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In applying the two interpretative themes of "frontier" and "ethnicity", the book examines the externalization from and internalization to China by a number of the tributary affiliates and outlying territories of the by-gone Qing Empire (e.g. Korea, Vietnam, "Outer" and Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang) The historical developments dissected here are certain overlooked aspects of the otherwise well-scrutinized international history of 20th-century East Asia. These helped transform the territorial domain and ethnic composition of the Chinese state from "imperial" to "national" The book is unique in blending analyses of "domestic" and "international" developments involved in China's modern reincarnation, and in providing an integral narrative that links historical themes pertinent to the eastern and western halves of China. While the frontier characteristics of the Chinese state in the pre-industrial age are not news to the field of China studies, this is the first study contending that "frontier China" has remained a fitting characterization of the rising Asian giant.
would have substantiated its claim of sovereignty over Tibet. What we know is that after 1949, the antagonism between the People’s Republic of China and the West provided the CCP with a convenient justification to solve the Tibetan question forcefully. A remaining question is what role the United States played in the western containment. In the last stage of the Chinese Civil War, to a certain degree CCP leaders’ deliberation of their strategies toward the frontier regions was influenced by a
restoration of French sovereignty in Indochina. The second was that the people in the area would not be able to gain independence without tangible assistance from the outside. Roosevelt and Chiang had never before disagreed on such fundamentals. Meanwhile, the Cairo Conference did not help reduce the distance between the two with regard to the form and extent of outside assistance in postwar Indochina. By the time of the Cairo Conference, neither Roosevelt nor Chiang had substantiated their
of assistance in the war against Japan be considered “on their military merits.”75 Now that Washington’s attitude was clarified, the KMT government began to readjust its own policy accordingly. The first public sign of Chongqing’s new policy appeared in an editorial of the Zhongyang Ribao in late July. Although reiterating Chongqing’s intention to “liberate [jiefang]” all Japan’s insular possessions in the central and northern Pacific, the editorial articulated a new attitude that all territories
within two months. At the time the Chinese government already installed in North Vietnam a formidable force under General Lu Han. But among these only 38,000 troops were intended for occupation purpose. The rest was destined for transportation to northern China, where a new round of civil war between the KMT regime and the Chinese Communists just began to unfold.80 Fearing that he would be unable to maintain China’s military superiority in Indochina, Chiang tried for the last time to enlist
the Macartney Embassy from England (1793) for relaxing trade restrictions and for establishing a permanent diplomatic relationship. This was the last time the West presented the relational norms among equal states to China in a gentlemanly manner, and this was also the last time a Qing ruler, with confidence and conviction about China’s centrality in the world, could counter the Western norms with China’s own.13 When the second long scene of this inter-systemic encounter began, the curtain was